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Abstract 
The delivery of IS services is very resource consuming in all organizations. In an era in which 
management optimization is one of the bases for competitive advantage, sourcing options must be 
judged carefully. Traditionally, the dilemma has been considered in terms of make (insourcing) or buy 
(outsourcing). But both of these options have shown a certain amount of problems. Although 
outsourcing has allowed firms to concentrate on their core competencies, it has also shown several 
issues that prove it is not a panacea. Insourcing, on the other hand, does not allow a great deal of 
flexibility and we also find that it is every time more frequent that firms do not want their amount of 
staff to grow. Between both options, the internal mechanism has arisen. Its use entitles the creation of 
an intermediate society between the organization and the market. This article shows two cases of 
organizations from different environments in which the sourcing process involved the creation of an 
intermediate organization to act as the described buffering mechanism. Both processes were related to 
the IS/ICT function, one in Spain and another one in Italy. The study of the two cases has helped us 
identify and confirm empirically a number of features achieved by this internal mechanism use. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In the last few years, we have seen the importance of information systems and information and 
communication technologies (hereafter IS/ICT) in organizations steadily increasing. This increase has 
entitled that organizations have had to deal with the way to deliver these services. Traditionally the 
alternatives to do this have been two poles of what is now considered to be a continuum but which for 
some time was considered to be just the two possible existing options: outsourcing (buy) and 
insourcing (make). 
Outsourcing is the process by which external agents perform organization’s activities while insourcing 
is the process in which the organization performs the functions in-house. We also refer to insourcing 
when a firm undertakes an outsourcing process and later decides that the services should be performed 
again by its own personnel and even in the case in which an organization examines the costs and 
possibilities of outsourcing but finally decides not to use this sourcing option (Hirscheim and Lacity, 
2000). 
As time has passed, both alternatives have been examined in detail in the IS/ICT sector by different 
authors, practical cases have been made available, and a certain amount of problems have been found 
in both of them. 
On the one hand, outsourcing has been blamed for making organizations lose control over IS/ICT 
assets (King and Malhotra, 2000; Lee et al. 2003; Gupta and Gupta, 1992), lose flexibility (Lee et al. 
2003; Gupta and Gupta, 1992), have to go trough the possibility of threats of opportunism from the 
supplier (King and Malhotra, 2000), lose IT expertise and corporate memory (King and Malhotra, 
2000), lose of qualified personnel (Lee et al. 2003; Gupta and Gupta, 1992) and lose of competitive 
advantage in information management (Lee et al., 2003) as well as in the innovation capacity (Earl, 
1996). 
Moreover there are also problems derived from the complexity of breaking a contract in case of 
dissatisfaction (McFarlan and Nolan, 1995; Lacity et al. 1996), the use of not very qualified personnel 
by the contractor (Earl, 1996), the possibility of a misalignment between the outsourcing organization 
and the contractor (Lacity et al. 1996) and even an increment in costs when many organizations 
outsource as a way do cut down costs (Lacity et al. 1996). 
On the other hand, insourcing means not achieving the main reasons that make organizations 
outsource. This is not been able to control costs, not being able to concentrate on the nuclear capacities 
of the organization and having a very low level of flexibility over workers. 
As we can see, both outsourcing and insourcing of IS/ICT have major drawbacks. However, we must 
consider that these drawbacks will have a greater weight depending on how important IS/ICT are for 
the organization. This is, for organizations in which IS/ICT are just a commodity which must be dealt 
with, choosing the best combination possible of outsourcing and insourcing will probably be enough. 
Normally we will find that very small organizations completely outsource IS/ICT, an that as they grow 
they tend to start creating their own IS/ICT services; once they grow over a certain amount of 
employees (or the IS/ICT needs grow above a certain limit) they try to increase the proportion of 
outsourcing. 
But, what happens when the firm considers IS/ICT to be a source of competitive advantage, a nuclear 
activity? Due to the problems with insourcing and outsourcing, these organizations have had to find 
other alternatives to overcome these problems. Between these alternatives we can mention internal 
markets, strategic alliances, business process outsourcing and selective sourcing. We now define these 
four alternatives. 
 
• Strategic alliances. Two or more organizations jointly develop functions in the search of 
competitive advantages. For a strategic alliance to function and be successful over time, all the 
participating organizations must consider that they are obtaining value from the alliance; in other 
words, that a “win-win” situation occurs (King, 2001). There are three types of strategic alliances 
(Barney, 2002): non-equity alliances, equity alliances and joint ventures. Non-equity alliances are 
based on contractual relationships, so firms are all stakeholders, but not necessarily shareholders. In 
equity alliances and joint ventures an independent company is created. 
• Internal markets. A company creates its own organization to undertake certain tasks or it allows 
one or more of its units to act autonomously and to transact with other units of the company. This 
is, strategic alliances and internal markets are similar mechanisms, just in the first it is two or more 
firms getting together to create an independent company, while in internal markets it is just one 
enterprise the one creating the new company. 
• Business Process Outsourcing (hereafter BPO). BPO consists on handing over control of an IS/ICT 
based process (for example, human resources management or accounting) to another organization 
(Rouse and Corbitt, 2004). The firm thus eliminates the need for certain IS/ICT areas since the 
company who supplies the service will be responsible for the IS/ICT required to provide it. 
• Selective sourcing. Selective sourcing consists in subcontracting just certain parts of a given 
organizational function while retaining others in-house (Lacity et al. 1996), this is, to find a mix 
between what is done outside the organization and what is done inside (King, 2000). It is specially 
used in the IS/ICT area, due to the complexity of the function and the number of tasks involved.  
 
As we can now see, the two alternatives formerly mentioned in the article are just two points in a 
continuum (see Figure 1), that starts in insourcing, passes trough outsourcing and arrives to BPO. In 
this continuum, as we move from the starting point to the ending point we find less effort from the 















Figure 1. The source continuum 
Sourcing alternatives have been widely explored in the literature, quite often in relation to IS/ICT. 
Probably the theoretical framework most widely used to explore sourcing alternatives, this is, the 
make-or-buy decisions has been transaction cost economics, derived from the original works of Coase 
(1937) and Williamson (1979). According to transaction costs, markets would always be used as the 
organizational form, but every time a market failure appears, a firm (i.e. a bureaucracy) is created as 
an answer to this failure (Ouchi, 1981). These failures could be due to issues such as bounded 
rationality, uncertainty, complexity, opportunism or small numbers.  
Bounded rationality means that people try to behave rationally but, due to limited knowledge and 
imperfect cognitive capabilities, this rationality is limited (Greiner and Goodhue, 2005). This bounded 
rationality causes uncertainty since one side can never be sure how the other side is going to behave in 
a negotiation. Complexity is to be expected in any relation, but in the IS/ICT area it is increased due to 
the object of the relation, that are normally not easily to measure (i.e. it is very difficult to estimate 
precisely how long installing a new operating system and migrating all email accounts can take). 
Small numbers appear when in a relation, and due to the typical evolution of tasks, the process of 
specialization leads to a point in which it is difficult to find an alternative supplier for a product or 
service. Opportunism is based on the idea of self-interest and increases even more the uncertainty.  
But sometimes, in the presence of any of the above failures, moving from markets to bureaucracies is 
not the solution, and some other organizational forms are needed (Ouchi, 1981). This happens when 
tasks are “[…] highly unique, completely integrated, or ambiguous for other reasons […]” (Ouchi, 
1981: 134). As we can see, these attributes are frequently applied to IS/ICT tasks, which gives us a 
hint that probably in this area, the decision between make (bureaucracy) or buy (market) has a much 
wider spectrum of possibilities that should be explored. Ouchi himself suggests the clan form: a group 
based in common values and beliefs, thus allowing minimization of goal incongruence and tolerating 
high levels of ambiguity in performance evaluation. Greiner and Goodhue (2005) explore open source 
communities as an intermediate option, these open source communities having some characteristics 
similar to the clans found by Ouchi. However, clans are not a mechanism easily found, since there are 
based more in perceptions and values of the individuals than on general parameters usually found in 
different environments. 
Strategic alliances have also been explored frequently, in the IS/ICT sector and outside it. But there 
seems to be a certain lack in the literature of articles exploring the buffer mechanism that internal 
markets allow. In this article we are going to focus on this alternative, the internal market strategy, 
trying to answer the following research questions: what are the advantages and disadvantages of the 
internal market strategy? When and how should it be used? What issues have to be dealt with in the 
process? 
In order to answer these questions, we have based our research on two practical cases developed in 
Spain and in Italy. Both these cases were related with the IS/ICT function. The one in Spain involved 
the use of this solution in a Public University as a way to outsource certain IS/ICT functions while 
retaining a good level of control over workers and over management of these functions. The one in 
Italy was that of a SME which decided to create a buffer company to manage the implementation 
project of an ERP System. 
This article is organized as follows. First, we explore the internal market strategy. We then present the 
two cases that have been studied, followed by a section in which we show the research methodology 
that was used in each of the two cases. We also show other cases that we know about and that we 
expect to study in further detail in order to confirm better the results found. Then some common 
findings to both cases are shown. We believe many of these findings can be generalized to all internal 
market strategy cases. Last we discuss on the results, we highlight some limitations to the work done 
up to this point and we end with some conclusions which we hope can be used by managers facing 
sourcing alternatives. 
2 INTERNAL MARKETS 
As has already been defined, internal markets is a mechanism in which a company creates its own 
subsidiary firm to undertake certain tasks; it is also a term used when a unit from the mother company 
is separated from it and starts operating as an autonomous unit. Usually this new organization or the 
autonomous unit will provide services not only to the parent company but also to other companies in 
the market, thus guaranteeing a competitive pricing structure and an appropriate quality of service 
(King and Malhotra, 2000) since the subsidiary should be almost the same as any other external 
supplier (Dearden, 1987). In the following we are going to concentrate in the case in which there is a 
new company and it is not a unit that has been allowed to become independent. 
This created company acts as a buffer organization between the mother organization and the market, 
thus allowing for “[…] increased responsiveness of internal suppliers, better quality with lower cost of 
internally-supplied services and products, elimination of fluff, de-bureaucratization, de-
monopolization, uniform measures for comparing the performance of various units, and greater 
opportunity for development of management skills […]” (King and Malhotra, 2000: 327). This is due 
to the created company being very close to the mother organization but, at the same time, being 
independent. 
3 THE TWO CASES 
3.1 Case 1 – Spanish Public University 
The first case was that of a Spanish Public University that decided to create the buffer society as a way 
to outsource certain IS/ICT functions while retaining a good level of control over workers and over 
management of these functions. The university has roughly 20,000 students and a total budget for the 
management of IS/ICT of around 8 M€. It has 45 staff dedicated to IS/ICT management. 
As the university faced the need to enlarge the number of staff dedicated to IS/ICT following the 
natural increase of IS/ICT services needed that has taken place in all organizations, it found that 
growing the internal structure was very difficult due to tight restrictions in Spanish Public 
Administrations
1
. Outsourcing was also considered but the geographical position of the university (the 
Canary Islands, more than 2,000 km. from Mainland Spain) and the specificity of tasks to outsource 
meant there was an important shortage of providers available. 
Due to this, the decision to create a buffer organization was taken. This organization was created 
during the year 2005 and it started providing services in 2006. Its budget for 2007 was about 700,000 
Euros with a number of staff of about 25. It provides help desk services as well as some application 
development services. The objective of the enterprise is to break-even at the end of each financial 
year. 
Rough estimates showed that if the same tasks had been developed in-house the total cost would have 
been around 1 M€, due to higher salaries that public employees are entitle too. On the other hand, 
outsourcing would have also meant a figure close to the same 1 M€, since, as was stated previously, 
enterprise from Mainland Spain willing to provide the services would have charged that extra quantity 
in accountancy for their benefits and for the extra costs of having to operate a unit in a remote place. 
This shows that, very roughly, the internal market option has allowed for savings of about 30%. This 
is not absolutely true since certain overhead costs (creation of the enterprise, costs associated to the 
heads of IS/ICT in the university who are part of the Board of Directors of the newly created 
company, etc.) have not been considered. 
3.2 Case 2 – Italian SME 
The second case was an Italian SME (we will subsequently call it MainFirm) in the iron and steel 
sector that decided to create a buffer company (that will be called BufferFirm) in order to manage the 
implementation project of an ERP System. The company was created in 1996 and started providing 
consulting services immediately. The following year, the implementation project took place and the 
new firm started providing consulting and technical services as programming, customization and 
training. The turnover was 200,000 Euros the first year, 700,000 the second year, 1.5 million the third 
year and 2 million the fourth year. The firm ended its activity in 2001, once the rollout of the ERP was 
completed and it was stable. 
In this case, the bases to create this firm came from the high level of outsourcing that was already 
being used and the reduced dimension of the IS/ICT department in the main firm. Due to this, the top 
                                              
1 In Spain, Public Universities have to follow the same rules that are applied to Public Administration in general. 
management decided to create a new consultancy company which was owned by the firm (45% of the 
shares) and by four experts in business process reengineering, programming and project management 
(55% of the shares). 
The new firm started analyzing the main business processes, in order to identify the critical aspects 
that had to be taken into account in the ERP selection phase. As result of the analysis, the adoption of 
a national  ERP called Diapason was suggested. This ERP had been developed by a software vendor 
(which will be named SoftwareFirm) and the recommendation was made due to economic reasons and 
because Diapason was considered to be the reference in the industry in Italy. 
The BufferFirm management decided that the implementation would be done through a gradual rollout 
per module and per site. This is, rather than buying an ERP implementation project (software and 
services), partnership was signed with the SoftwareFirm. According to the contract, BufferFirm would 
become a business partner of SoftwareFirm, which meant that BufferFirm’s personnel were involved 
in some ERP implementation projects as observers. This would allow a group of consultants in 
BufferFirm to be able to understand how to run an ERP implementation project from both the 
technical and from the managerial points of view. 
After six months BufferFirm became able to run implementation projects on SoftwareVendor's 
software. From that moment BufferFirm’s personnel were involved in the MainFirm’s project and in 
some other projects of SoftwareVendor in which “body rental” agreements were conducted. 
3.3 Other cases 
Apart from the two mentioned cases which have been studied in detail, the authors also know, and are 
in the process of studying, a number of cases in different environments which could help confirming 
the main results that have been found in both the above cases: 
• Car dealer in Spain. This firm distributes the cars of one of the biggest worldwide carmakers. 
Initially they concentrated in just one region in Spain but over time they have developed in 
South America and Africa. Some time ago, they found the IS/ICT applications provided by the 
automaker were not enough for their management, so they started developing their own. As 
time passed, they started selling these applications not only to their own subsidiaries but also 
to other franchises of the automaker around different part of the world. In order to better deal 
with the whole process they decided to create an IS/ICT company, that provided IS/ICT 
services to the mother firm and to other enterprises. Now it is one of the firm’s main sources 
of competitive advantage. 
• Banking sector. There are several cases in different European countries in which Savings 
Banks have created organizations specifically dedicated to the management of their IS/ICT. 
Our idea is to explore some of these cases, of which we already have proof in Spain and in 
Italy. 
4 METHODOLOGY 
In both cases studied, the key to the research methodology was that one of the authors of this work 
was an agent in the process. This, obviously, introduces a certain bias into the investigation. This bias 
has been dealt with by having each of the possible conclusions drawn from each of the cases carefully 
analyzed by the other author, in order to avoid the mentioned bias. However, even with this is not 
absolutely possible to state that there is not a certain bias in the whole research, which is going to be 
further avoided by analyzing other cases. 
Four types of techniques or data collections methods where used: participant observation, document 
retrieval, in-depth interviews and focus groups. Evidence obtained was qualitative as well as 
quantitative. The time frame considered starts at the creation of the enterprise and ends when the later 
had been working for one year. This accounts for a total of 20 months for the case of the Spanish 
University and 36 months for the Italian SME. In both cases, the analysis took about three months and 
it started after the enterprise's first year of operation, except for some data that was collected as the 
process was happening, as explained below. 
Participant observation and document retrieval was possible since, as has been stated previously, the 
authors of this work were part of the process. More than 50 hours were spent over the one year study 
period directly observing the help desk area in the case of the public University. In the case of the 
Italian SME, one of the authors was involved in the ERP implementation project and he spent three 
days per week taking part in the design, modelling and training sessions. Data was transcribed, 
structured and double checked by the authors to ensure accuracy. 
Observation was supplemented with several in-depth interviews that were carried out with participants 
in the two processes. In total, more than 30 interviews were done. These interviews lasted typically 
around 75 minutes and used a semistructured questionnaire in which several issues were considered: 
satisfaction with the process and with the relations between the mother and the created firm, problems 
found at the beginning, what was expected to happen in the near future, etc. 
In case 1, four focus groups were carried out. Two of them took place with the staff from the 
application development and user support areas of the university while the participants in the other 
two were their counterparts from the created enterprise. The objective of these focus groups was to 
analyze with the main actors in the process what their impressions of the process were, what their 
evaluation of the first year of work and suggestions on improvements for the following years. 
Also in case 1, measures of the performance of the services delivered by the firm were obtained trough 
a survey carried out by the evaluation department of the university. In this survey, every service 
delivered by the university was evaluated: student registration process, IS/ICT services, campus 
services, transportation, etc. 
5 FINDINGS 
The study of the two cases has helped us identify and confirm empirically a number of features 
achieved by this internal mechanism use. First, the internal market allows a very good balance 
between the best of insourcing and the best of outsourcing. On the one hand, there is a good control 
over human resource practices and over technical decisions (i.e. which products to specialize in). On 
the other, a good level of control over the function being sourced is achieved, since it is no more a 
black box where the managers do not know what is going on, becoming a function that can be 
analyzed. 
Second, in the process of subcontracting to the buffer organization, the mother organization learns 
how to organize contracts, which means to dimension properly prices, times and requirements as well 
as even the process of choosing which things to outsource and which not. This learning process can be 
very useful for a later process of outsourcing to markets directly. This is quite important, since many 
of the problems found with the outsourcing processes that take place in organizations could be solved 
by acquiring this experience. So the newly created organization really acts as a buffer between the 
mother firm and the market, becoming a learning experiment. Outsourcing is complex and, as was 
seen at the beginning of this paper, there are many possible flaws in the process, so going through and 
intermediate phase can help organizations to better outsource.  
Analyzing the costs involved in the process, on the one hand the cost control and cost reduction that is 
usually followed by outsourcing processes is also achieved, as well as allowing for a good level of 
alignment between the objectives of both organizations. In this case, we can concrete that in the 
Spanish University case a savings of roughly 30% was achieved. But on the other hand it is true that, 
as will be seen later, the process of creating and launching a new organization entitles a series of costs 
that must not be undervalued. 
Internal markets also ease the resistance to change in the workers of the mother organization, since the 
process is not a full outsourcing, which is always seen as more fearful, but a subcontracting to an 
organization which is quite close to the mother organization, and over which this later retains a certain 
level of control. 
Finally, this mechanism allows for the implementation of human resource practices similar to those in 
the mother organization to take place, reducing resistance to change as well as problems derived from 
frictions between workers in similar job posts with very different contracts. 
But the experience in the two mentioned cases has also shown that this is a very complex process and 
that there are several issues that have to be carefully dealt with. First of all, and since this kind of 
mechanism is not used very often, the process has to be carefully explained to all the involved 
workers. Even doing this, a certain resistance to change and certain fears will probably be found in 
workers, since they may not fully understand what is going to happen to them, specially in the long 
run. Basically, they can think the final objective is to pass their job posts to the buffer enterprise. 
Related to this, workers of the mother enterprise may not fully understand the buffer organization is an 
independent organization, with its own managers that make their own decisions. This means that 
influencing human resource practices can be done only at a very high level, not at the base level. 
Last, but not least, the buffer organization works best when it also provides service to third party 
companies (King and Malhotra, 2000), forcing it to compete with market rules to avoid falling in the 
small number (Ouchi, 1980) trap which would lead towards a bureaucracy again. The dilemma is that 
it is quite tricky to achieve a good balance between the quantity of effort dedicated to each kind of 
client, specially since the mother firm will control part of the board of directors and have shares in the 
created company, thus being able to influence its behaviour. 
6 DISCUSSION 
When and why should the internal markets mechanism be used? Basically, when the organization (the 
bureaucracy) and the market fail to deliver a consistent solution to organizations. This is, under certain 
conditions the traditional make-or-buy decision can provide what organizations need. 
If the organization and its stakeholders are comfortable with an increase with the number of human 
resources that it dedicates to a function (being IS/ICT or any other), insourcing can be used. If the 
organization considers the task not nuclear, and has a number of service providers in the market 
around it that can deliver those services, outsourcing should be considered. The latter being done 
taking into consideration the dangers of outsourcing that have been warned by several authors and that 
have been explored previously in this article. 
Also small enterprises will tend to prefer more classical solutions (i.e. outsourcing, insourcing and 
selective sourcing) before getting into the management complexity associated with internal markets 
and with strategic alliances. 
But when none of the above happens, when organizations cannot o do not want to increase the number 
of internal human resources and when outsourcing is not advisable or desirable, new sourcing 
strategies have to be explored, since the make-or-buy poles do not provide a good enough solution for 
many organizations. These sourcing alternatives include strategic alliances and internal markets. When 
the company can find other firms that do not strategically compete with it and that have similar 
interests, the strategic alliance can be explored. If it wants, or it has, to follow this path on it own, then 
they will be facing an internal market strategy.  
Our experience with two very different cases (different geographical regions, different sectors) show 
that, although the process of building a new enterprise has a high initial cost, the benefits that are 
achieved are quite rewarding: good control over the function, organizational learning and cost savings.  
7 LIMITATIONS 
As was stated previously, the authors of this paper have been part of the processes being studied, 
which introduces a certain bias intro the overall process and conclusions obtained. Although every 
statement has been double crossed by the authors and, when possible, all documentation has also been 
cross examined, this does not fully ensure that this bias has been eliminated. The authors expect that 
further research into other cases will allow removing this bias and better guarantee that conclusions 
can be generalized to a greater extent. 
On the other hand, there has to be a consideration about how the selection of the cases that has leaded 
us to this paper was done. The selection was done, initially, just on the base of being two similar cases 
found by authors which came to write this paper together precisely because of having worked in 
similar cases in the past and having written about them. Due to this the paper is based on two very 
different cases. One is a public Spanish university, the other one an Italian SME. Two sectors 
involved, education and industry, more precisely iron and steel sector. The selection is not fully 
representative and was not done because of any other reason than those exposed above. This 
introduces some limitations in the extent to which conclusions can be extended. 
8 CONCLUSION 
We consider that these two cases prove that the use of the internal market mechanism trough buffer 
organizations allows enterprises to find a very interesting sourcing alternative, especially for their 
IS/ICT function, by providing a method that brings together the best of insourcing and of outsourcing. 
This is, we have proven in practice that the internal market approach is superior to outsourcing and 
insourcing, as was theoretically suggested by King and Malhotra (2000). 
Can we guarantee that these results can be used in other sectors and in other countries? As was stated 
previously, in the limitations section of this paper, from the case selection it is obvious that there is no 
security that under different conditions and in different sectors, the conclusions can be used. But, on 
the other hand, it is true that common issues that have arisen in such different environments and that 
coincide in both cases so precisely can be reasonably expected to be found in other cases. However, 
further research to be developed will allow us to confirm this. 
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